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.Government repression can have more than oneeffect: it can inhibit opposition action because of fear of its effects; but rather thanbeing preventive, it can in some circumstances encourage more protests because[328], (1of the moral outrage against government that it can produce.22.See the summary on these issues in Bendix, Force, Fate and Freedom, as well as thestatements on De Tocqueville and beyond in Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy.Lines: 323.Fiallos Oyanguren, Nicaraguan Political System, pp.116 17. 24.Fiallos Oyanguren, Nicaraguan Political System, pp.126 27.The amrocs were9.5ptthe paramilitary organization that had replaced the Frentes Populares Somocistas. Such organizations were inoperative during my mission.The Sandinista regimeLong Parevived this mode of operation with organizations of its own.PgEnds:25.For readily available details, see Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, pp.228 29.26.Fiallos Oyanguren, Nicaraguan Political System, pp.130 31.27.Fiallos Oyanguren, Nicaraguan Political System, p.76.[328], (14.The Anastasio Somoza Debayle Period1.Details of the event appear in Obando Bravo, Golpe sandinista, and Pataky, Llegaronlos que no estaban invitados.2.Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, pp.168, 175, 184, 186.Relevant background materialis found in Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, pp.213, 218,229, 232 34.All informed sources acknowledge the success of Somoza s 197577 anti-fsln repressive offensive.3.Brief and useful is the statement by Abreu, Brazil s Guerrilla Trap. Ramírez, Adiósmuchachos, emphasizes the quasi-religious motivations.4.The Somocistas, however, viewed themselves as a permanent majority, which theytraced to the more progressive nature of their Liberal Party, especially since the1930s.Shifts in party identification associated with periods of government-relatedsocioeconomic changes have been noted for other historical two-party systems pre-cisely in the 1930s; see the comparisons between the United States and Colombiain Solaún, Colombian Politics. In Nicaragua we are not talking about modern mass parties, but rather a system of parties of notables in which the rulingparty became linked to the government bureaucratic machine.But Somocista pro-gressive self-identity as if a social democratic force was very frustrating to militantoppositionists; see Chamorro Cardenal, Jesús Marchena. notes to pages 83--85 3295.That the reported perceptions were widespread and held also by some Somocistasis shown by Cardoze, Nicaragua ; Cardoze was a minister of labor under GeneralSomoza.6.Precipitating events are conditioned by extant predisposing political culture (values)and structure (organization), and in turn the precipitants or triggering factors canhelp to change political values and organization.7.In contrast to Luis s reputation, West Point trained General Somoza had alwaysbeen feared as a more dangerous, violent individual.See, for example, the com-ments in this regard in Visión, the Latin American weekly, about the time of GeneralSomoza s election to his first term, September 16, 1966, p.28, and February 17,1967, p.13; Visión s characterization was made in the context of a not unfavorablecoverage of the dynasty.Ironically, the magazine was later purchased by GeneralSomoza.Throughout my tenure there remained a distinction between Somocistas[329], (17)friendly to Luis and those closer to the general, but the former did not constitute apolitical faction, and several of them continued to participate in the government.8.Foreign observers were impressed by the low differentiation that existed betweenLines: 400the personal and public spheres in Nicaragua.I often heard statements thatpersonal misappropriation of resources took place at an unusually high rate in pri- 5.0pt Pgvate businesses as well, which was interpreted as a weakness or underdevelopment also of private formal organizations.Several scandals had recently involved GeneralLong PageSomoza s private business empire.9.Even in societies with low social differentiation, princes concentrate resources in PgEnds: TEtheir hands by taxing their subjects, who tend in turn to oppose the extension ofpower of the political authorities.As Somoza expanded his power, the state became[329], (17)increasingly autonomous from the private sector or class structure: it representedmore Somoza s interests than of his class of origin.But this operating autonomyof the state from class interests did not mean its autonomy or independence fromSomoza s private interest (or patrimony); hence, corruption increased, and thestate was even less geared to maintain the autonomy and independence to deliverthe (transcendent) common good.In the terms of Chehabi and Linz, SultanisticRegimes, sultanistic tendencies had become stronger.Many of my contacts told methis story in plainer language.10.In spite of the recent efforts at quantification by Nicaraguan technicians, it is notpossible to overstress the need to view with caution all published social statistics.Gross domestic product per capita (at constant prices, 1958) grew fairly steadily, asthese dollar figures indicate:1960 1963 1965 1969 1970 1974 1975 1976231.42 294.08 333.90 343.30 364.11 410.02 405.22 413.80Sources: United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, vol.1 (1978), p.910; unesco, Statisti-cal Yearbook, 1965, p.17; 1970, p.18; 1977, p.32.As the population rapidly increased from 1.41 million in 1960 to 2.23 millionin 1978, it became more urban: from an estimated 39.9 percent in 1960 to 51.2in 1976; however, in 1976 still only 24 percent of the population lived in cities of 330 notes to pages 85--86100,0000 or more inhabitants.Reflecting the above structural changes, in 1953 theoccupational breakdown of the population was 42 percent in primary activities, 15percent in secondary activities, and 43 percent in tertiary activities.By 1977 the newdistribution was 22, 24, and 54 percent, respectively.Thus, the pace of urbanizationwas rapid, but that of industrialization was moderate.Other pertinent sources arethe World Development Reports of the World Bank and Wilkie and Reich, StatisticalAbstract of Latin America.11.Vilas, Sandinista Revolution, pp.92, 93, 94.LaFeber (Inevitable Revolutions) presents adifferent picture for the whole of Central America.As if per The Communist Manifesto,he sees a crisis of capitalism: increased concentration of wealth, monopoly capitalincreasing the dispossession and exploitation of the workers, and impoverishmentof the labor force, all of which result in revolutions.Interestingly, LaFeber includesCosta Rica in his diagnosis (e.g., p.132) but, in fact, its democratic regime con-[330], (1tinued through the economic changes; successful revolution took place only inNicaragua.To oversimplify, Nicaragua s revolution does not fit a neat model ofeconomic crisis; it can be partly seen as a Tocquevillian case of regime collapseLines: 4following unsuccessful liberalization. 12.It is precisely because of the historical shifts affecting class interests in processes15
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