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.54On November 8, signaling a switch to the offensive, Bush ordered more than150,000 additional U.S.ground, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf, for a totalAmerican force of about 380,000.He announced, I have today directed the Sec-retary of Defense to increase the size of U.S.forces committed to Desert Shield toensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that benecessary to achieve our common goals. In view of the ten resolutions adoptedby the U.N.Security Council since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he added, inresponse to a reporter s question, I think Saddam Hussein should fully, withoutcondition, comply to the U.N.resolutions.And if this movement of force is whatconvinces him, so much the better. 55The end of the cold war made cooperative action through the United Nationsfeasible by removing the threat of a Soviet veto.On November 29, the U.N.Secu-rity Council authorized the use of all necessary means to expel Saddam s forcesfrom Kuwait if he did not pull out by the resolution s deadline of January 15,1991.56 The Security Council s decision, by a 12 to 2 vote, with China abstainingand Yemen and Cuba casting no votes, marked an important turning point in thePersian Gulf crisis.The world community declared its willingness to support aU.S.-led military action, if necessary, to drive Iraq from Kuwait.The resolutionset a countdown for solving the crisis.Bush 41 later noted, Although we didn trealize it at the time, it [the resolution] also changed the debate with Congress,creating a context for the use of force which helped bring it about.The Security57Council had voted to go to war. On December 19, Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Powell arrived in Saudi Arabiafor a detailed examination of Schwarzkopf s war plan.They spent a day and ahalf with Schwarzkopf.Wolfowitz, concerned about prematurely entering intoa costly, casualty-producing ground campaign, wanted to make certain all themilitary options had been considered and addressed.During a break in the delib-erations, he asked Schwarzkopf how long the air campaign should last before ini-tiating the ground offensive.Schwarzkopf replied that he would be happy witha full year of airstrikes.When the principals reassembled, Wolfowitz pushedSchwarzkopf to make this comment to Cheney and Powell.58 For Wolfowitz, thelonger the air war lasted, the better.In contrast, Schwarzkopf feared that thepoliticians would cease military action before he could achieve his air or groundobjectives.Wolfowitz tried to assuage these fears, noting that the President andCheney had said it would be politically acceptable for Schwarzkopf to take allthe time the field commanders needed. 59The spirit of the Western Excursion lived on.Washington s pressure led Schwar-zkopf and his team to look further to the west than they had earlier planned. 64 Paul D.WolfowitzCENTCOM s final ground plan called for moving the Army s VII Corps 100,000men, their equipment and supplies several hundred miles to the west.Thereaf-ter, it would engage in a massive tank attack in the form of a gigantic left hook.60However, the ultimate plan did not call for troops to move far enough west tosolve the Scud problem.Baghdad was not directly threatened, thus allowingSaddam to hold onto power.As Cheney and Powell prepared to leave Saudi Arabia, Wolfowitz received atelephone call from Ivri, who explained that Moshe Arens, the Israeli DefenseMinister, wanted to meet with Cheney immediately concerning potential Scudattacks by Iraq.On the way back to the United States, Cheney agreed to senda high-level delegation to Israel before January 15.Realizing that Baker wouldbe anxious to preserve the State Department s prerogatives, Cheney proposedsending Lawrence S.Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State, and Wolfowitzto Israel with the message that the United States would do everything it could toprotect Israel from Iraqi Scud attacks.Wolfowitz and Eagleburger managed toconvince the Israeli government to accept Patriot antimissile batteries, thoughIsrael refused to allow U.S.personnel to crew them.61 The U.S.delegation alsosounded out Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir about what Israel would doif attacked by Iraq.Shamir would not disclose what action he might take, butpromised to consult with the United States before acting.62On January 2, Gates convened a meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee.Wolfowitz thought that a letter from Bush to Saddam might still make a difference.He found one draft prepared by the NSC staff rather mild. He and Jeremiahwere eager to make it tougher.They proposed changes that the others accepted.63In its final form, the brink-of-war letter stated: We stand today at the brink ofwar between Iraq and the world. The future of Iraq was at stake and the failureto withdraw from Kuwait would mean calamity, tragedy, and further vio-lence for Iraq.The final sentence read: I hope you weigh your choice carefullyand choose wisely, for much will depend on it. 64On January 9, Baker presented a photocopy of the letter to Tariq Aziz, Iraq sforeign minister, who refused to accept it or carry it to Saddam.65 Baker and Azizwere unable to find common ground for discussion in their efforts to negotiate asettlement to the Persian Gulf crisis.Thereafter, the U.S.Congress granted Bushauthority to go to war on January 12, 1991, along mostly partisan lines, by a slimmajority in a sharply divided Senate (52 to 47) and a solid majority in the House(250 to 183).66MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQOn January 17, the United States began its air attack on Iraq.The next day, Iraqstarted firing Scuds towards Israel.Arens called Cheney immediately after theattack and asked the United States to ship additional Patriot antimissile batteries,as well as American personnel to crew them, as soon as possible.Cheney asked The Road to Baghdad, Part One: Operation Desert Storm 65Arens to receive a U.S.team to discuss these developments, to which Arensagreed.67 On January 19, Ivri called Wolfowitz, who sensed that the Israelis wereclose to a retaliatory strike against military targets in western Iraq. You can giveus any information you want, Wolfowitz indicated. But there s been no decisionon our part that we re going to get out of your way.All I can do is take down whatyou tell me. Wolfowitz then reported the conversation to Cheney.68At a weekend meeting at Camp David, Bush agreed to a two-track plan.First,Eagleburger and Wolfowitz would return to Israel to reinforce the message thatIsrael should stay out of the war and let the United States respond on Israel sbehalf to any Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli territory.Second, at Cheney s sug-gestion, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L.Armitage would go to Ammanto meet with Jordon s King Hussein.69Eagleburger and Wolfowitz, who arrived in time to welcome the U.S.-staffedPatriot crews, tried to reassure the Israelis that the U.S.military would deal withthe Iraqi Scuds.70 Schwarzkopf minimized the Scud problem, which the Israelisviewed as an expression of unconcern
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