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.Assad s joining the Gulf War coalitionprobably owed more to a belief that he needed U.S.leverage to recover theGolan than to rivalry with Saddam (Ross 2004: 48).29 Israelis had believed that the war would prove the value of strategic cooperation(Melman and Raviv 1994: 382 3).However, political calculations in the WhiteHouse and Haass s advice prevailed over Cheney and Wolfowitz (ibid.; Bush andScowcroft 1999: 452).30 As President Bush assembled his coalition in October 1990, the IDF killed 21 andinjured over 150 Palestinians on the Temple Mount; they were violently protestinga radical Jewish group s attempt to lay a foundation stone for a replacementTemple.The U.S.supported UNSC resolutions condemning Israel s conduct anddeploring its refusal to admit UN investigators.The Jewish community was sur-prised, hurt, and furious at Bush s lack of understanding of Shamir, but Bushnotes that [t]he deaths of Palestinians in Jerusalem made that difficult (Bush andScowcroft 1999: 379).Disclosure that Sharon funded settlers taking over a church-owned building in the Christian Quarter alarmed even AIPAC; Congress imposed a$1.8 million fee offsetting that funding (Puschel 1992: 110 11).31 A plurality believed Israel should agree to exchange land in the Territories forpeace; and a large majority favored granting the 120-day delay Bush hadrequested on Israel s request for loan guarantees.32 Steven Cohen s 1991 AJC survey showed hardening Jewish opinion; a pluralityapproved settlements in the territories and a shrinking plurality favored returnof some land.Some leaders regretted their candor and called the Wilstein surveyan ambush (Melman and Raviv 1994: 432 3).33 Moshe Amirav, the Likud central committee member fired by Shamir afternegotiating with Faisal Husseini, represented the Council for Peace and Secur-ity, a group of retired IDF officers (including over half of all retired generals)who favored a two-state solution.34 U.S.Interreligious Council for Peace (2,000 clergy of all faiths); Project Nishma(formed when four Israeli generals appealed for support of the peace process);Jewish Women Leaders Consultation on Israel (to engage Palestinian women);New Israel Fund (seeking funding for peace efforts outside CJF and UJA);and Committee for Judaism and Social Justice (intellectuals and public person-alities headed by Jerome Segal, president of Jewish Peace Lobby) (Marcus 1990:557).35 Cohen identified minority opinions as amoral Zionists (Likudniks, neoconsand religious Zionists published in Commentary), and moralizing Universalists (who only criticized Israel and were found in Tikkun) (Cohen 1989).36 Over a third of the Committee were political appointees in the Reagan adminis-tration.37 Right-wing Israeli commentator Daniel Doron also argued that the Arab Israeliconflict was a derivative conflict and Israel a target of convenience for Araband Islamic rage focused on the West (WSJ-Eur 30 Oct.1991: 8).38 In addition to $300 million in compensatory aid and $700 million in usedequipment, joint projects were announced for the Arrow ATBM and othersystems; Secretary Cheney announced stockpiling in Israel for use in anyregional conflict (not just jointly-agreed undertakings); JMPG meetings wereresumed; and joint exercises were expanded (Puschel 1992: 103 7).AIPAC con-stantly pushed for and bragged on these programs (e.g.NER 20 May 1991: 86). Notes 21739 By March 1990, DoD leaders uniformly praised the joint programs with theIDF (Puschel 1992: 107).40 AIPAC argued that the guaranteed loans would generate sales by Americanvendors, but there is no evidence that meaningful bureaucratic or lobbyingsupport resulted.9 The loan guarantees: new equilibrium, old result1 Saudi King Fahd needed a fatwa confirming that when the kingdom s survivalwas at stake, he could accept help from unbelievers (Friedman 1991).2 Bush made the promise publicly to Arab-American groups in October 1990(DoS Dispatch 1990: 130).Shamir believed Bush had also promised Arableaders to withhold guarantees unless settlement construction was ended (Jacob-son 1994: 179).Martin Indyk believed that Bush made such a promise inexchange for Arab participation at Madrid (Madison 1992: 925 6).There is nopersuasive evidence that is so, and Bush denied it (PC 12 Sep.1991 in FPBSep./Oct.1991: 67).3 This is the reverse of Eagleburger s argument that the U.S.needed Israel as apartner against future unknown contingencies
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