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.The major target for advo-cates of a peace dividend was the military budget, but other ele-ments of the national security and foreign policy bureaucracywere not immune from calls for downsizing.The State Depart-ment was forced to close embassies and consulates, and it under-went a major reorganization.The intelligence community founditself on the defensive for its failure to predict the end of the ColdWar.There were even calls in the Senate for dismantling the CIA.Because so much of the United States s espionage effort wastargeted either directly or indirectly at Soviet targets, it is not sur-prising that many saw a diminished need for classical humanespionage in the post Cold War world.The prospect of a demo-cratic Russia held the hope that whatever information might beneeded could be obtained through open sources and that Russian Espionage and National Security Threats 59compliance with arms control agreements and other cooperativemeasures could be verified through technical means and throughincreased transparency and the open exchange of information.Proponents of espionage found it difficult to challenge theview that the scope of the Soviet threat to the United States haddiminished greatly.Instead, they built their case on three differ-ent arguments.First, although the threat of deliberate Soviet mil-itary action against the United States had diminished, a differentthreat existed.The problem now was accidental war and theuncontrolled proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons and relatedtechnologies.The root causes of these problems were found in thedecay of the Soviet system.Organizational decay and politicalinfighting had created a situation in which the Russian govern-ment lacked the capability to control its own military forces.Thedisintegration of the military had left many scientists in poverty,and many were reportedly willing to sell their services to thehighest bidder.A second line of argument held that although the UnitedStates was the sole remaining superpower, this condition couldnot last.The fundamental dynamics of world politics requiredthat other world states move to balance the power of the UnitedStates.The emergence of challengers was inevitable, the espi-onage proponents warned.The prudent exercise of Americanpower could delay this process but not prevent it from occurring.It was simply a matter of when and what state or states would bethe challenger.Some expected a resurgence of Russian power.Others pointed to China as the most likely challenger.Japan andGermany were also identified as states that needed to be watchedclosely.Finally, some argued that although the Russian threat haddiminished, a new breed of security threats now faced the UnitedStates.Although in the Cold War and throughout American his-tory foreign states had been the primary threat to American secu-rity, in the post Cold War era nonstate actors would constitutethe greatest threat.In the popular imagery employed to make thisargument it was asserted that during the Cold War the UnitedStates had faced a dangerous dragon, and in the post Cold Warera it was being confronted by a legion of poisonous snakes.Twotypes of snakes were singled out as especially dangerous.Thefirst type was international criminal groups and drug smugglers.The second type was international terrorist groups (Berkowitzand Goodman 1989). 60 Understanding the Contemporary Espionage DebateFrom the point of view of intelligence collection, these newthreats are extremely challenging.The sheer size of the Soviet mil-itary, diplomatic, and espionage operations provided Americanintelligence organizations with multiple points of entry, but this isnot the case with these new threats.They require that espionagebe directed at either individuals or small groups.Gaining accessto these people and gaining their confidence will not be easilydone.It will require time and the recruitment of new individualsinto the spy game as well as the development of new competen-cies.Someone who has spied or run agents in the Soviet Uniontargeting Soviet diplomats is not necessarily qualified to operatein the Middle East, Africa, or Asia against a drug smuggler, ter-rorist cell, or ex-patriot Russian physicist.Directing espionage against potential challengers to theUnited States s superpower status, such as China, is also fraughtwith danger.Without clearly articulated collection tasks and pri-orities it is quite possible that little information of value will becollected.Organizational routine and bureaucratic inertia couldcome to dominate the espionage effort.Moreover, there is a dan-ger of setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy: if, or more accu-rately when, these new U.S.spies are caught, it is possible that thetargeted state may respond by increasing its military power ortaking steps to distance itself politically from the United States.These are the very events that are most undesirable.Economic EspionageBy definition espionage is not an activity that is directed solely atmilitary targets.Espionage is a means of acquiring informationthat would otherwise be unavailable.One area of espionage thathas begun to receive a great deal of attention is economic espi-onage.It is estimated that in the post Cold War era the percent-age of collection and analysis resources devoted to economicissues by the U.S.intelligence community has risen from 10 per-cent to 40 percent.Unlike most espionage directed at military tar-gets, economic espionage is as likely to be carried out by an allyas it is an adversary.The top twelve states placing economic spiesin the United States are China, Canada, France, India, Japan,Germany, South Korea, Russia, Taiwan, Great Britain, Israel, andMexico (Johnson 2000). Economic Espionage 61Three broad styles of economic espionage against the UnitedStates have been identified.The first targets are present and for-mer nationals who work for American companies.China, Taiwan,and South Korea are said to practice this type of economic espi-onage.The second type of economic espionage relies heavily ontraditional forms of Cold War military-oriented techniques andpractices such as bribery, theft, and wiretapping.France, Russia,and Israel are identified as the leading practitioners of this type ofeconomic espionage.The third style of economic espionage ispracticed by Japan.It relies upon networks of industry and pri-vate organizations to obtain desired information.Insight into the type of information sought after in economicespionage comes from a U.S.government study of Israeli spying.The report identifies three primary types of information beingtargeted.They are information to strengthen Israel s industrialbase; information that can be exchanged with others for profit;and information that can be used to strengthen Israeli politicalties with other states, especially as they relate to arms and intelli-gence needs
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