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.Schedule pressures rose considerably, as did the burden ofproof required for an engineer who had a concern or a dissentingview about a safety issue that might require a delay in the schedule.Roger Tetrault, the former CEO of McDermott International and amember of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, remarkedthat people began to underemphasize the risks in order to get fund-ing& but nobody in the aircraft industry who builds a new plane whowould say after 100 flights or even 50 flights that that plane was oper-ational.Yet, the shuttle was declared an operational aircraft, if youwill, after substantially less than 100 flights. 40 In sum, the initialframing of the program established an atmosphere in which engi-neers found it increasingly difficult to speak up or express dissentingviews when they had safety concerns.The most effective leaders take great care, when they launch newinitiatives, to anticipate the unintended consequences of a particularframe.For instance, in early 2002, when Craig Coy became CEO ofMassport the agency responsible for operating aviation facilitiesand shipping ports in the Boston area he created three businessunits, and he directed three executives to manage these units as profitcenters.In the past, these operating unit managers had some controlover expense budgets, but they had no authority over the revenue-generation activities.Now, each business unit leader becameaccountable for the revenues, costs, and cash flows generated by hisor her area. CHAPTER 3 " AN ABSENCE OF CANDOR 81This change represented a major shock to the culture at theagency.Of course, Coy recognized up front that this new way of look-ing at the business might encourage managers to compromise onsecurity issues to bolster profits and cash flow.Such actions would behighly damaging for the institution in the wake of the September 11attacks, particularly due to the role that Boston s Logan Airportplayed in that tragedy.Therefore, he took quick action to ensure thatthis would not take place, beginning with a very large commitment ofcapital to make Logan Airport the first commercial aviation facility inthe nation to electronically screen all checked baggage.Coy made thecommitment without resorting to the usual return on investment typeanalysis that he had begun advocating for nonsecurity projects.Thisearly move, although substantively important, also served as animportant signal and symbol to the operating unit managers that theyshould not allow the profit center mentality to cloud their judg-ments about security priorities.41Taken-for-Granted AssumptionsThe final, commonly experienced soft barrier involves assumptionsabout how people should interact with others in the organization,particularly those at different horizontal levels or in different verticalunits.Every organization culture develops these presumptions overtime; they become the consensus view of the way that we workaround here. Gradually, these assumptions become taken forgranted by most members of the firm.As Edgar Schein notes, manyof these cultural norms begin to take root when the founder estab-lishes the organization, and they get propagated through the continu-ous retelling of stories and myths about the early days of the firm.Asnew members enter the organization, they gradually become indoc-trinated into these informal, yet widespread and commonly under-stand ways of working. Naturally, some of these cultural normschange over time, particularly as firms become larger and more42bureaucratic. 82 WHY GREAT LEADERS DON T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWERAt NASA, the evidence from the investigation suggests thatadherence to procedure and rules of protocol had become a strongcultural norm by the 1990s.People did not typically communicatewith people that were more than one level up in the organization.Deference to seniority and experience also became accepted prac-tice.As one former engineer explained to me, Everything at NASAreverts back to the most senior person at the table& if they don t buyin, then your idea is just that an idea. 43 Each of these norms tendedto stifle open communication at the space agency.At a large specialty retailer that I studied, senior managers tookfor granted that contentious debates should be resolved during off-line conversations rather than large meetings of the entire leadershipteam.This had become routine practice at the firm, and as new mem-bers joined the executive team, they soon learned how to act withinthis set of cultural norms and boundaries.Each person that I inter-viewed offered a response similar to this one: The meeting is not aforum where we engage in debate.If there is disagreement, then wequickly tend to agree to take it offline. 44Unfortunately, although many of the new members learned to play the game, they did not find this practice to be productive.Theybecome increasingly frustrated at the lack of open debate during staffmeetings.One senior executive mentioned that he had grown accus-tomed to the norms at his prior employer, where real calls weremade in the room& there was healthy give-and-take. In this case,people often did not have an opportunity to rebut the ideas and pro-posals offered by colleagues, because those arguments were put forthin private, offline meetings with the president as opposed to widergroup forums.Of course, not all taken-for-granted assumptions about interper-sonal behavior and collective decision-making reflect dysfunctionalbehavior, but they can develop into a problem because the behaviorsdo become so deeply embedded in the organizational culture overtime.Moreover, because they are often taken for granted, people do CHAPTER 3 " AN ABSENCE OF CANDOR 83not regularly question why they are behaving in this manner.Theysimply find themselves conforming to time-honored practice at theinstitution.Leadership MattersSystemic factors both structural and cultural clearly inhibit can-did dialogue and debate within organizations.This chapter hasoffered a glimpse of some of the most common hard and soft bar-riers that arise within organizations.Many more surely do exist.Ihave argued that these systemic factors often shape people s behaviorwithin firms, both the actions of those who may appear to be sup-pressing dissent as well as the behavior of those who are failing tospeak up
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